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Not all the nuclear waste destined for Yucca Mountain is in the form of spent 
fuel. Some of it will be radioactive waste generated from the production of 
nuclear weapons. This so-called defense waste exists mainly as corrosive liquids 
and sludge in underground tanks. An essential task of the U.S. high-level 
radioactive waste program is to process these defense wastes into a solid 
material – called a waste form. An ideal waste form would be extremely durable 
and unreactive with other repository materials. It would be simple to fabricate 
remotely so that it could be safely transported to a repository for permanent 
storage. What’s more, the material should be able to tolerate exposure to intense 
radiation without degradation. And to minimize waste volume, the material must 
be able to contain high concentrations of radionuclides.
The material most likely to be used for immobilization of radioactive waste is 
glass.  Glasses are produced by rapid cooling of high-temperature liquids such 
that the liquid-like non-periodic structure is preserved at lower temperatures. 
This rapid cooling does not allow enough time for thermodynamically stable 
crystalline phases (mineral species) to form.  In spite of their thermodynamic 
instability, glasses can persist for millions of years (see Chapter 24).
2An alternate to glass is a ceramic waste form – an assemblage of mineral-like 
crystalline solids that incorporate radionuclides into their structures. The 
crystalline phases are thermodynamically stable at the temperature of their 
synthesis; ceramics therefore tend to be more durable than glasses. Ceramic 
waste forms are fabricated at temperatures below their melting points and so 
avoid the danger of handling molten radioactive liquid – a danger that exists 
with incorporation of waste in glasses.
The waste form provides a repository’s first line of defense against release of 
radionuclides. It, along with the canister, is the barrier in the repository over 
which we have the most control. When a waste form is designed, the atomic 
environment of the radionuclides is chosen to maximize chemical durability.
Elements such as zirconium and phosphorous can be included in the waste form 
that react with and make some radionuclides less soluble and therefore less 
likely to be released. 
The long-term performance assessment of radionuclide containment requires the
development of models for each part of the barrier system. It is almost certainly 
easier to model the corrosion and alteration of waste forms than it is to develop 
coupled hydrologic, chemical, and geophysical models of radionuclide transport 
away from a repository. Therefore, much time and effort has been spent 
optimizing the chemical durability of both glass and ceramic waste forms for 
radionuclide containment (Ewing, 2001). This has not been an easy task.  Three 
problems in particular posed the greatest challenges.
The first is that radionuclides decay, transmuting into daughter elements that 
may have different chemical properties. These new elements might degrade the 
existing mineral by making it unstable.  A good waste form that works well for 
uranium may work poorly for lead, its final decay product. 
The second problem is that the radioactive decay itself damages the solid over 
time. Radioactive decay is an energetic process in which ejected particles and 
the recoiling nucleus disrupt the surrounding atoms. A single alpha-decay event 
can displace thousands of atoms in the surrounding volume. We know from 
laboratory measurements that radionuclides are more easily released from 
radiation-damaged structures than from materials that do not sustain radiation 
damage.
The third problem is that radioactive waste, particularly the high level waste 
from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium and uranium, 
contains a variety of elements with widely varying chemistry. The waste form 
must incorporate the radionuclides, as well as non-radioactive elements such as 
silicon and sodium that are present in the waste stream as a result of waste 
processing.
A number of ceramic waste forms have been developed that minimize these 
problems and provide a potentially useful host for radionuclides (Lutze and 
Ewing, 1988a). For ceramics, the mineralogy can be tailored to the waste stream 
by selecting solid mineral phases with structural sites that can accommodate the 
waste elements, as well as newly formed radioactive decay elements. Radiation 
3damage can be minimized by selecting mineral phases that allow atoms to renew 
or regain their original crystalline structure, a process known as annealing. For 
example, actinide phosphate minerals anneal more readily than actinide silicate 
minerals. 
Despite the superior thermodynamic stability of crystalline materials, 
borosilicate glasses have become the preferred waste forms. One reason is that 
the processing technologies associated with this glass are believed to be easier to 
adapt to handling highly radioactive material. In addition, borosilicate glass is 
relatively insensitive to variability in the composition of the waste stream Hench 
et al., 1981; Lutze and Ewing, 1988b; Donald et al., 1997; for detailed reviews 
of waste form development). The United States decided in 1982 to use 
borosilicate glass as the waste form for storing high-level defense waste at the 
Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site, and in 1990 to use borosilicate 
glass as the waste form for high-level waste at Hanford, Washington.The other 
U.S. site having a large amount of high-level waste -- the Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory -- is still in the process of choosing a waste form. Until 
recently, the Department of Energy was considering a titanate-based ceramic 
waste form for disposal of fissile plutonium and uranium from dismantled 
nuclear weapons. Work on this waste form was suspended early in 2002 (DOE, 
2002),  and there are no current plans to include ceramic waste forms in the U.S. 
high-level waste repository.
Ceramic corrosion
Corrosion refers to the reaction of the ceramic with water. Mechanisms of 
corrosion include selective leaching of certain elements, dissolution of material, 
and the breaking of chemical bonds by water molecules (hydrolysis). Any of 
these reactions may result in the release of radionuclides from the waste form in 
a repository.
Except for some gaseous radioactive decay products, neither ceramic nor glass 
waste forms will release radionuclides under dry conditions. Radionuclides will 
be released only through water contact. In addition, movement of radionuclides 
through ceramic is so slow that they cannot simply migrate to the surface and 
escape -- even at the highest anticipated repository temperatures.   To release 
radionuclides, corrosion must be able to penetrate into the ceramic.
Waste forms are subjected to numerous tests to determine their corrosion rates. 
Generally, the waste form is immersed in water and the concentrations of 
released species are measured over time. The temperature and composition of 
the water solution, chosen based on anticipated repository conditions, are varied 
to gauge their effects on release rates. The measured release rates allow 
estimates to be made of the release rates from a waste form in a repository. An 
additional goal is to use the test results to develop a mechanistic understanding 
of waste form corrosion, including the identification of the rate-limiting 
corrosion mechanisms.  This understanding allows defensible extrapolations of
short-term test results to long-term predictions of waste form corrosion rates in a 
repository. 
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Any prediction of the long-term durability of a ceramic waste form must also 
consider the effect on the material of radiation damage. The type of radiation 
that most compromises the ceramic waste form’s durability is due to alpha 
decay. Each alpha decay gives rise to the emission of an alpha particle and the 
recoil in the opposite direction of a heavy nucleus. As a result, the local 
environment surrounding the alpha decay site is full of displaced ions and alpha 
particles. Radiation damage  may be accompanied by swelling of the material of 
15 volume percent or more. The swelling causes cracking, flaking off of thin 
layers, and an increase in surface area. All these processes enhance radionuclide 
release.
Experimental work has shown that materials damaged by alpha decay can 
corrode ten to a hundred times faster than undamaged materials (Wald and 
Weber, 1984; Weber et al., 1998). In these tests, the ceramics either are doped 
with a short half-life radionuclide to accelerate radiation damage or are 
bombarded with high-energy ions to simulate the effects of radiation.
However, radiation-damaged crystals can and do repair themselves through 
annealing.  If diffusion rates are high enough, ions in the material tend to 
migrate back and resume their original structure. Whether the damage can be 
repaired depends on temperature (higher temperatures allow faster annealing) 
and the rate of further damage. If alpha damage piles on top of previous damage 
that has not been repaired, the entire structure may become amorphous -- the so-
called “metamict” state sometimes found in natural minerals that contain 
radionuclides.
In addition, some mineral structures are better able to accommodate radiation-
induced defects into their structures. Sickafus et al. (2000) have shown that 
fluorite-structured solids such as zirconates are less perturbed by defects 
introduced by radiation than comparable pyrochlore structures. Such knowledge 
allows tailoring of both durability and radiation tolerance of potential ceramic 
waste forms.
Natural analogs: The long-term data
Fortunately, information is available to help predict the long-term performance 
of waste forms. Both ceramics (i.e., minerals and rocks) and glasses occur 
naturally and are millions or, for some ceramics, billions of years old. These 
materials have compositions and structures similar to those of the proposed 
nuclear waste forms. The minerals in rocks sometimes contain uranium and 
thorium that decay and over time generate radiation damage. Therefore, the 
durabilities of these minerals are thought to be good indicators of long-term 
durabilities of comparable radiation-damaged nuclear waste forms (Ewing and 
Jercinovic, 1987).
The major uncertainty in the use of natural analogs is that the environmental 
history of the samples is often poorly known. Although radiometric dating may 
5supply an age,  no information is available to tell anything about either the time-
temperature history of the sample or the amount of time spent in contact with 
water (Lumpkin, 2001). It is known, however, that these mineral phases have the 
durability needed to survive in a variety of geologic environments for periods 
much longer than the Environmental Protection Agency’s mandated 10,000 year 
lifetime of a nuclear waste repository.
Corrosion of ceramic waste forms in a repository
As the preceding discussion makes clear, there are significant uncertainties in 
using laboratory and natural analog data to make long-term predictions of 
ceramic waste form performance in a repository. There are two main issues.
The first source of uncertainty involves limitations of laboratory corrosion data.   
The range of anticipated repository conditions, in terms of temperature and fluid 
chemistry, is very extensive. Because of this, data on waste form corrosion do 
not cover the entire range of potential repository conditions. This problem is 
amplified by the underlying uncertainty of model predictions of repository 
conditions that the waste form will experience.
Most laboratory tests necessarily have durations of only a few years at most, 
whereas repository lifetimes are on the order of 10,000 to 100,000 years. If the 
rate-limiting reaction mechanism for the waste form has not been identified, 
there is no mechanistic basis with which to extrapolate laboratory test results to 
long time periods. There is currently no consensus in the waste form community 
that the correct rate-limiting mechanisms have been identified for any of the 
existing waste forms. Natural analog data, while reassuring, has always been 
problematic because of the lack of knowledge of the geologic history and in 
particular the duration of water contact of the natural analog material.
The second uncertainty is the effect of radiation damage. Based on corrosion 
tests of irradiated materials, radiation damage is known to significantly 
accelerate ceramic corrosion. Of particular concern is the possibility that the 
swelling that accompanies the accumulation of radiation damage may break 
apart the ceramic along the crystal’s grain boundaries and greatly increase the 
exposed surface area (see Figure 26-1). Since release rates of radionuclides are 
generally proportional to waste form surface area, radiation damage could lead 
directly to an increase in radionuclide release. It is difficult to quantify this 
effect from tests of irradiated materials because their radiation damage is 
induced rapidly and their damage may not be representative of real ceramic 
waste forms. So while it is known that radiation damage will lessen the 
ceramic’s durability, the magnitude of the effect is unknown.
A ceramic waste form for plutonium immobilization
One ceramic waste form was, until recently, being considered for the Yucca 
Mountain repository (DOE 2002): the pyrochlore-based titanate ceramic. This 
waste form was developed as part of the U.S. DOE effort to immobilize as much 
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dismantled nuclear weapons. The waste stream is primarily plutonium and 
uranium metal. However, it also includes plutonium and uranium alloys, impure 
oxides, un-irradiated fuel residues, and other materials generated during fissile 
material processing.
The selected ceramic waste form is titania-based (TiO2) and contains roughly 10 
weight percent plutonium. The solid phases are mainly pyrochlore, with lesser 
amounts of brannerite and rutile (Table 26-1). The pyrochlore structure is 
essentially a titanium oxide framework containing two atomic sites that readily 
accommodate plutonium and uranium. Minor components of the waste stream 
generally substitute into one or more of the three mineral phases. Figure 26-1 
shows a scanning electron microscope image of a section through the ceramic.
The titanate ceramic is fabricated using a cold press and sinter technique. Fine-
grained reactive oxide precursors and the waste oxides are mixed and pressed 
into pellets at 13 to 20 MPa (130-200 atmospheres) and then heated at 1350oC 
for four hours in a non-reactive gas. The process has been automated for remote 
operation in a glove box.
Before selecting this waste form, DOE considered several other ceramics,  
including cubic zirconia (ZrO2), zircon (ZrSiO4), uraninite (UO2), gadolinium-
zirconate (Gd2Zr2O7), monazite (CePO4), apatite (Ca5(PO4)3OH), and perovskite 
(CaTiO3). Summaries of the properties of these minerals can be found in Ewing 
et al., 1996, and Ewing, 1999.  The titanate was chosen for four reasons. First, 
extensive data is available from previous work to develop titanate waste forms 
for other waste streams. Secondly, uranium and plutonium have high solubilities 
in titanate (>10% by weight).  Third, a simple fabrication method is available for 
titanate’s synthesis. Finally, the titanates have high durability in water. 
Susceptibility to radiation damage was not a primary consideration. Ceramics 
were chosen over glasses for several reasons, including their much lower 
corrosion rates (Cochran et al., 1997).
Two key issues were considered in developing the titanate waste form. First, the 
waste form must pose an effective barrier that would prevent terrorists from 
having access to the plutonium in the waste.  In 1994, the National Academy of 
Sciences recommended the use of the “spent fuel standard.” This standard 
mandates that retrieval of fissile elements from the waste should be at least as 
difficult as retrieving such elements from spent reactor fuel (National Academy 
of Sciences, 1994). For this reason, the ceramic waste will be placed inside cans 
of high-level waste; this “can-in-can” approach is illustrated in Figure 26-2. 
High-level waste contains the highly radioactive elements cesium-137 and 
strontium-90, which provide a source of penetrating radiation not present in the 
ceramic waste form. The high-level waste provides the radiation barrier to 
prevent human access.
The second issue is criticality. The waste consists primarily of fissile plutonium-
239 and uranium-235, which could potentially become sufficiently concentrated 
to provide critical masses and hence accelerated nuclear reactions. Two 
7scenarios deserve consideration. The first is that criticality arises during waste 
form production and within the waste form itself. The second is that criticality 
occurs during storage. This could happen, if, for example, plutonium or uranium 
is leached from the waste form, transported, and deposited in a localized area. A 
similar process occurs in nature and is responsible for the formation of localized 
concentrations of metals in ore bodies, such as gold or uranium.  Calculations of 
the transport and deposition of fissile elements in a repository system needed to 
evaluate the potential for criticality rely on coupled chemical-thermal-
hydrologic models of repository evolution. There is considerable uncertainty in 
interpretation of the results of these calculations, as described in chapters 13 and 
16.
Because of these concerns, two neutron absorbers, hafnium and gadolinium, 
were added to the ceramic. Both of these elements capture neutrons without 
fissioning and therefore greatly reduce the chance for criticality for both 
scenarios, as long as these neutron absorbers remain with the plutonium or 
uranium.
Corrosion tests of the titanate waste form
The titanate waste form has been subjected to a variety of corrosion tests to 
measure its chemical durability under repository-relevant conditions. These tests 
show that as long as the ceramic has not been damaged by radiation, 
radionuclide release rates are extremely slow (Roberts et al., 2000). For many 
tests, in fact, it is not clear that anything at all is being released because the 
measured concentrations are too near background levels to distinguish a signal 
(Bakel et al., 1999). Examination of the surfaces of reacted ceramics using 
electron microscopy usually show no reacted layer, or, in a few cases, a layer 
only a few nanometers thick (see Figure 26-3).
Figure 26-4 shows that at the measured corrosion rates, the maximum rates of 
plutonium and uranium release would, even after a million years, result in 
penetration and potential release of radionuclides of only about a one-millimeter 
thick layer of ceramic.  At this rate, only a very small fraction of the total 
radionuclide inventory could be released over the lifetime of the repository.
The tests that were designed to determine the rate-limiting mechanism for 
corrosion of the titanate were inconclusive. Reaction rates were so slow that it 
was impossible to quantify the influence of changing environmental parameters 
and therefore to deduce the rate-limiting mechanism.
Over time, titanates will accumulate radiation damage due to the presence of 
alpha emitters. For alpha decay in the pyrochlore ceramic, the average alpha 
particle will travel about 10 micrometers and the average recoil nucleus will 
travel about 50 nanometers (Weber et al., 1998). Each alpha particle produces 
about 100 atomic displacements and each recoil nucleus produces about 1,000 
displacements. This self-radiation damage will cause the ceramic to become 
amorphous in as little as 1,000 years (Muller and Weber, 2001) depending on 
the temperature evolution of the repository.
8Even after sustaining radiation damage, however, pyrochlores may be able to 
retain their radionuclides for long times. Evidence of this capability comes from 
observations of natural titanium-rich radioactive pyrochlores (betafites). A study 
of betafites from nine locations including completely amorphous samples, 
showed that although the minerals had lost or exchanged cations in their “A” 
sites (see Table 26-1), the minerals were able to retain virtually all of their 
uranium and thorium in their “B” sites. This was true even in specimens as old 
as 1.4 billion years (Lumpkin and Ewing, 1985; Lumpkin, 2001).
The long-term effect of radiation damage on the corrosion rate of titanate 
ceramic is unknown. To account for radiation damage in performance 
assessment, the measured reaction rates were increased by a factor of 30 above 
the measured values for undamaged ceramics (DOE, 2001; Shaw et al., 2001). 
This factor is an average value based on previous measurements of radiation 
damage effects on the corrosion rates of related ceramics.
The titanate waste form in the repository
It is useful to compare the relative uncertainties of performance predictions of ceramic waste 
relative to the waste forms currently destined for the repository - borosilicate glass and spent fuel. 
Glass waste forms are thermodynamically unstable and will always seek to achieve a lower energy 
state by re-structuring into crystalline forms, at some rate that is difficult to predict. Ceramic 
degradation rates do not suffer from this uncertainty. They are already in a low-energy ordered 
state and do not transform. Ceramics have a known solubility that can be used to provide a 
conservative upper limit to their solubilities, and therefore radionuclide release rates. Glasses have 
no solubility limit that can be used with certainty to provide these conservative estimates.
Both glass and ceramic waste forms can be engineered to be compatible with the predicted 
oxidation state of the repository. For Yucca Mountain this will be a relatively oxidized state, that 
is, some free oxygen will be present. Compatible oxidation states between the waste form and the 
local environment will avoid the potential for the occurrence of oxidation reactions between the 
site groundwater and the waste form. Such reactions are known to degrade the waste form and 
release radionuclides (see Chapter 23 of this volume). These types of reactions are often 
enzymatically catalyzed by microbes, which could significantly increase the reaction rate.  Most 
spent nuclear fuel is composed dominantly of reduced uranium, that is, uranium that will react 
with oxygen to form new uranium solids and aqueous species. In a hot humid oxidizing repository, 
such as is expected for Yucca Mountain, the uranium will oxidize, and in the process, 
radionuclides are likely to be released. The rate of this process is highly uncertain, but must be 
estimated in order to predict radionuclide release rates from the spent fuel. Neither glass or 
ceramic waste form corrosion rate predictions suffer from this uncertainty.
Summary
9The waste form is one component of the repository that we have a great deal of control over. It can 
be engineered to be durable in site groundwaters and resistant to radiation damage. Ceramic waste 
forms are preferable to borosilicate glass due to their greater intrinsic durability. Both glass and 
ceramic are preferable to spent fuel because they will not undergo oxidation reactions that are 
likely to release radionuclides. Long-term predictions of waste form performance are limited both 
by uncertainties in extrapolation of short-term tests to long time periods, and by the inadequacies 
of our mechanistic models of waste form corrosion. An even more severe uncertainty may be that 
the calculations of waste form corrosion rely on and are limited by the uncertainties in the results 
of thermohydrologic model predictions of repository conditions over time. 
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Figure Captions
Figure 26-1. Scanning electron microscope (SEM) image of titanate ceramic.
Figure 26-2. Ceramic can-in-canister concept.
Figure 26-3. Transmission electron microscope image of unreacted (upper) and 
reacted (lower) pyrochlore sample. Lower sample was reacted for 28 months in 
pH 4 solution at 250C and shows a thin amorphous alteration layer (photos 
courtesy of David Chamberlain, Argonne National Laboratory).
Figure 26-4. Corrosion rates of three repository wasteforms; spent fuel, defense 
high level waste (borosilicate) glass, and the titanate ceramic  (Roberts et al., 
2000).
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Figure 26-1. SEM image of titanate ceramic. Dark gray = 
rutile, light patches = brannerite, groundmass = pyrochlore. 
Darkest spots are holes.
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Figure 26-2. Ceramic can-in-canister concept. Ceramic pucks are 
placed into cans that are then emplaced into high-level waste glass 
that provides radiation barrier to prevent unauthorized recovery of 
fissile elements.
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Figure 26-3. High resolution transmission electron microscope image 
of unreacted (upper) and reacted (lower) pyrochlore sample. Lower 
sample was reacted for 28 months in pH 4 solution at 250C. The 
extremely thin alteration layer on the reacted sample appears to be 
amorphous.
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Figure 26-4. Corrosion rates of three repository wasteforms. Symbols 
show release rates of Pu and U from ceramic waste form.
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